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CAN UZBEKISTAN ECONOMY RETAIN ITS HIGH GROWTH RATE? 
SCENARIOS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN 2015-30 
      Vladimir Popov  
ABSTRACT 
Uzbekistan in recent 10 years is an extremely successful economy – high 
growth (8%), low domestic and international debt, undervalued exchange rate, 
relatively even distribution of income, creation from scratch competitive export 
oriented auto industry. It is important though to avoid “dizziness from success” 
and to envisage possible growth traps in the future. This paper discusses two 
unfavourable scenarios – negative terms of trade shock due to the decline in 
cotton, gas and gold prices (a deterioration of the current account balance by 10 
p.p. of GDP) and a decline in growth rates of total factor productivity (TFP), as 
well as possible government responses to these shocks, in particular, changes in 
industrial policy.   
 
In recent years Uzbekistan promotes heavy chemistry industries (production of 
synthetic fuel and polypropylene goods from natural gas). This is the next stage 
of industrial policy after reaching food and energy self-sufficiency and 
successful auto industry development. There are reservations, however, against 
this strategy. First, gas production is about to decline due to depletion of 
reserves. Second, the level and growth rates of TFP in heavy chemistry are by 
far not the highest (they are the highest in light and food industry and in 
machine building). The increased share of heavy chemistry in total industrial 
output will cause the decline in the level and the growth rates of TFP. Third, 
auto industry is already a success, it may be reasonable to continue to support 
machine building industries of medium level of technology sophistication, like 
auto industry. For the country of the average size, export specialization in two 
major areas (autos and heavy chemistry) may be excessive. 
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Uzbekistan is the most successful economy of the former Soviet Union (FSU). 
In 2013 the GDP of the country exceeded the 1989 level more than two times. 
Among countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union only 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan could increase GDP more than two times, but 
they are large resource exporters, whereas Uzbekistan is not, though it exports 
gas and gold. Among transition economies, only China and Vietnam had more 
impressive growth. External and domestic public debt in Uzbekistan are low, 
the foreign exchange reserves are large, the exchange rate is not overvalued 
(Popov, 2014). 
 
Moreover, the government of Uzbekistan through strong industrial policy has 
managed to encourage and carry out large-scale progressive structural shifts – it 
achieved energy and food self-sufficiency, the share of industry in GDP, as well 
as the share of machinery and equipment in total industrial output and in export 
increased. A whole new branch of industry - automotive industry - was created 
from scratch, became competitive and now exports half of its products. In 2013, 
Uzbekistan sold abroad about 100 thousand cars, almost as much as Russia, 
whose GDP is 25 times larger. 
 
Income distribution in Uzbekistan is more even than in most other FSU 
countries, there are no billionaires, crime is low and life expectancy is much 
higher than in countries with similar levels of per capita income. 
                                                            
1
 The paper reflects the views of the author and not of the organisations with which the author is affiliated.  
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In general, from all points of view, Uzbekistan looks like a very successful 
economy, so that the main task today, apparently, should be to prevent 
"dizziness from success", to envisage possible economic risks for the future and 
to develop adequate government policy responses, needed to maintain economic 
growth of the past 10 years (8%). 
 
How to predict long term growth 
Growth theory gives the following formula for growth accounting – 
decomposition of growth (increase in output) by factors: 
 
dY = TFP + a * dK + (1-a) * dL, where 
 
dY  - economic growth (GDP) 
dK - growth rate of fixed capital, 
dL - the growth rate of labor (employment) 
TFP - the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) 
a  – the parameter of the production function, interpreted as the share of capital 
in national income and equal to about 0.4 for developing countries and 0.3 for 
developed countries. 
 
Population growth and the working age population (and, hence, employment, 
assuming the unemployment rate unchanged) are known quite accurately - 
demographic processes are characterized by high inertia that allows to make 
high-quality forecasts. In particular, the UN forecast suggests that by 2030 the 
total population and working-age population of Uzbekistan will grow at a rate 
of about 1% per year (Fig. 1). So in accordance with the formula for growth 
accounting the growth of employment will contribute about 0.6 percentage 
points (p.p.) to annual growth of GDP. 
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Fig.1. Entire population and working-age population, the UN forecast, 
thousand persons 
 
Source: UN Population, 2014. 
 
A few percentage points of GDP growth per year can be obtained from the 
increase in total factor productivity. In 1997-2009 growth rates of total factor 
productivity ranged from 0 to 4% (Chepel et al 2010), so that under favorable 
conditions one could expect growth of 2-3% per year. 
 
Therefore, to achieve annual GDP growth of 8-9%2, over 50% of growth (5-6 
p.p.) must come from the contribution of capital 
 
a*dK/K = dY/Y - TFP - (1-a)*dL/L, 
 
                                                            
2
 To achieve the proclaimed goal of per capita GDP of $7000 in 2030 (in prices of 2012) from the actual level of 
$1720 in 2012 (at market exchange rate), the annual growth of per capita GDP should be 8%. If population 
growth would be 1% a year, GDP will increase annually by about 9%.  
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Hence capital stock must grow at 12-15% per year (dK/K = 6%: 0.4 = 15%). 
And if the capital-output ratio is equal to 2 (K/Y = 2) and if, for the sake of the 
argument,  the retirement of fixed  capital stock is equal to zero (dK = GR, R = 
0, where G - gross investments, R - retirement) the share of investment in GDP 
(G/Y) should be maintained at 30% (G/Y = dk/Y = dK/K * K/Y = 15*2 = 30%). 
If the capital-output ratio would be higher than 2 and/or retirement will be 
higher than zero, the share of investment in GDP will have to be increased even 
more to maintain the growth rate of 8-9%. 
 
In recent years, the share of investment in GDP in Uzbekistan was significantly 
lower - 18-27% in 2000-12 (Fig. 2). It was particularly low in 2002-06 (18-
21%), even though external conditions were favorable (high world prices for 
major export products - gas, gold, cotton) and there was a significant surplus on 
current account.  
 
Fig. 2. Share of investment in GDP, %, current account balance as a % of 
GDP and GDP growth rates in 1987-2012, % 
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Source: WDI. 
 
 
Mystery of total factor productivity 
There are many papers that analyze factors of growth of TFP (see literature 
review in UNIDO, 2007).  In neoclassical theory total factor productivity 
growth is exogenous, i.e. determined outside of the model, by external factors.  
Endogenous growth theory attempts to explain changes in total factor 
productivity (labor and capital) by investments in fixed capital stock, education, 
R&D, foreign direct investment, the quality of institutions, openness of the 
economy and many other variables. Empirical studies, however, have not yet 
allowed to confidently predict the growth rate of total factor productivity. 
 
In 1994 Paul Krugman, based on growth accounting calculations in East Asia 
by Alvin Young, argued that the puzzle of the East Asian growth does not exist 
(Popov, 2002; 2010). He argued that Asia's rapid growth was mainly extensive, 
as in the USSR, that is was due to accelerated accumulation of capital, and was 
not caused by the growth in total factor productivity. He concluded that there 
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was no great mystery in this growth at all:  if the country is ready to devote 
more than one third of its GDP to investment, limiting consumption, then it can 
reach high growth rates. 
 
In the classical theory of economic growth it is assumed that an increase in one 
factor of production without a proportional increase in other factors inevitably 
leads to diminishing returns: for example, an increase in investment in 
machinery and equipment without a corresponding increase in employment will 
produce smaller and smaller increments of output. Therefore, to bet on 
investment alone – to rapidly accumulate physical capital – is not a reasonable 
strategy: capital efficiency will fall, so that the acceleration of growth, if 
happens, would be most insignificant. 
 
As an example, the advocates of this theory referred to the economic growth in 
the USSR, which was very high in the 1950s (8% annually), and then fell to 2-
3% in the 1980s due to, as they thought, over-accumulation of capital: the share 
of investment in GDP in this period increased to as much as 35%, fixed capital 
formation proceeded rapidly, but the results were more than modest. As Alice in 
the Wonderland once put it, it was necessary to run twice as fast to stay in the 
same place. Or, as the British "Economist" once wrote, the Soviet Union 
brought the share of investment in GDP to the Japanese level with very 
“unjapanese” results.  
 
It was believed that the Soviet economic dynamics is the best illustration of 
classical growth theory (Solow model):  if the contribution of technical progress 
is negligible, as it was in late USSR, i.e. if the growth is predominantly 
extensive, it is impossible to maintain high growth for a long time only with 
high investment; at the end of the day growth rates will inevitably fall, 
approaching the rate of population growth. 
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So Krugman predicted that the rapid growth of East Asia will soon end as the 
Soviet growth ended because of the depletion of reserves of labor – higher 
participation rates for women and decline of rural population as a result of 
migration to urban areas. And without the proportional increase in labor 
increased investment lead to diminishing returns, efficiency of accumulation 
decreases, growth slows down. 
 
However, time seems to have disproved Krugman’s predictions. After the East 
Asian crisis in 1997, growth continued and there are no signs that the growth 
rate of total factor productivity necessarily slows down as the share of 
investment in GDP increases. Say, in China TFP growth rates did not decline, 
although the share of investment in GDP has reached unprecedented levels in 
the world - almost 50%. 
 
As can be seen from Fig. 3, in Asian countries with relatively low GDP per 
capita (from $2700 to $6200 PPP –purchasing power parity) and in middle 
income countries (from $9,000 to $17,000 at PPP) TFP growth rates rose rather 
than fell, whereas in richer countries, including the U.S., they seem to have 
remained stable. TFP growth in the developed countries and territories (Hong 
Kong, Singapore, United States, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan) usually did not 
exceed 2% (Fig. 3). In the United States - a country that was in the past 100 
years at the forefront of technological progress, the growth rate of TFP was in 
1870-2010 of the order of 1-2% and only in certain periods (the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, when both employment and capital declined sharply, 
World War II) rose to 3% (Table 1). 
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Fig. 3. Rates of growth in total factorial productivity in Asian countries 
with different levels of income per capita and in the U.S. in 1970-2010 
Countries with a per capita GDP at PPP from $2700 to $6200 in 2012  
  
Countries with a per capita GDP at PPP from $9000 to $17,000 in 2012  
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Countries with a per capita GDP at PPP from $30,000 to $52,000 in 2012 
 
Source: APO (2013).  
 
Table 1. Growth rate of total factor productivity in the U.S. in 1870-2010, 
% 
Period  Average annual TFP growth rates 
1870 to 1900  ~ 1.5% to 2%  
1900 to 1920  ~ 1%  
1920s  ~ 2%  
1930s  ~ 3%  
1940s  ~ 2.5%  
1950 to 1973  ~ 2%  
1973 to 1990  < 1%  
1990s  > 1%  
2000s  ~ 1.5%  
    
1870 to 2010  ~ 1.6% to 1.8%  
1950 to 2010  ~ 1.2% to 1.5%  
Source: Shackleton (2013). 
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In most successful catch-up economies (China, Iran, Malaysia, Thailand) TFP 
growth often exceeded 5% per year (Fig. 3). However, in countries with similar 
to Uzbekistan per capita income level, TFP growth was no higher than 3% (Fig. 
3). So it makes sense to assume that under the most favorable circumstances 
TFP growth in 2015-30 would remain at the level of 2 - 3%. 
 
Scenarios for the future growth 
Favorable scenario.  TFP growth rates do not slow down, remain at the level of 
2-3% per year, export prices remain high, so that the trade balance and balance 
of payments on current account are in surplus. In this case, to ensure the growth 
of 8-9% the share of investment is expected to grow somewhat by the end of the 
period (2030) only if capital –output ratio would increase and higher share of 
investment in GDP would thus be required to achieve the same growth of fixed 
capital stock (15%) – Table 2. 
 
Under this option, there may be a gradual return of migrants working abroad. 
On the one hand, their return will reduce remittances that will negatively affect 
the balance of payments. But on the other hand, if they find a job in Uzbekistan 
in the export sector, losses from reduced remittances can be compensated by the 
increase in foreign exchange earnings from export growth. Moreover, the return 
of migrants can significantly increase the rate of employment growth in 
Uzbekistan: the return of 100,000 people a year would add 1 percentage point to 
employment growth, i.e. would add about 0.6 percentage points to annual 
economic growth rate.  But in this case it will be necessary to provide returning 
migrants with jobs that would require an additional increase in the growth rate 
of fixed capital - by 1 percentage point. To achieve such acceleration in growth 
of fixed capital stock it would be necessary to raise accumulation rate (the share 
of investment in GDP) by 2 p.p., for example, from 25 to 27% of GDP. This 
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will provide additional 0.4 percentage points GDP growth, so that economic 
growth will increase by 1 percentage point (0.6 % + 0.4%). 
 
Unfavorable scenarios. Falling prices for the main items of the Uzbek exports - 
gold, gas and cotton, which can cause deterioration in the trade and current 
account balances in the amount of 10% of GDP (in the past 20 years, current 
account balance varied between minus 7%  and plus 9% of GDP - Fig. 2). As 
can be seen from Fig. 4, prices of these products in the past 5 years were pretty 
high, so their decline in the future cannot be ruled out. 
 
Fig. 4. World prices for gold, oil and cotton, 1988-2013 
 
Source: Index Mundi, 
http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=cotton&months=300&
commodity=gold&indicator=price-ratio 
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In this case there are different policy options:  (1) devaluation of the national 
currency, (2) reduction of foreign exchange reserves without sterilization 
operations of the central bank, (3) reduction of foreign exchange reserves, fully 
sterilized by the central bank, that is, without changing the money supply in 
circulation. In the third case, reduction of saving can be avoided, but in the first 
two cases at least some reduction of private savings and investment is 
inevitable, so to maintain the previous rate of economic growth this decline 
should be compensated by increased public savings and investment. Without 
such a compensation a reduction of savings and investment by, say, 10 p.p. of 
GDP will cause a fall in the rate of growth of capital by 5 percentage points 
(K/Y = 2), which can slow down economic growth by about 2 percentage points 
per year (dK*a = 5*0.4 = 2). To avoid a decrease in growth, it will be necessary 
to increase the rate of accumulation by 10 percentage points through the 
mobilization of domestic savings and/or attracting capital from abroad (Table 
2). 
 
 
Table 2. Scenarios of economic development in 2015-2030 
Scenario 
TFP 
growth 
rate 
Current 
accounts 
balance 
Change 
in annual 
growth 
rates 
Increase in 
investments 
necessary for 
sustainable growth 
Basic – 
favorable  
2-3% Unchanged (at 
levels of 2010-
13) 
0 0 (stays at current 
level of 25 % of 
GDP) 
Unfavorable – 
worsening of 
terms of trade 
2-3% Decrease by 10 
% of GDP 
Decrease 
by 2 pp. 
Increase by 10p.p. of 
GDP (up to 35% of 
GDP) 
Unfavorable – 
decrease in 
TFP growth 
rate 
0% Unchanged (at 
levels of 2010-
13) 
Decrease 
by 2-3 pp. 
Increase by 10-15p.p. 
of GDP (up to 35-
40% of GDP) 
Worst case  0% Decrease by 
10% of GDP 
Decrease 
by 4-5 pp. 
Increase by 20-25p.p. 
of GDP (up to 45-
50% of GDP) 
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Another unfavorable scenario - the slowdown of growth of total factor 
productivity by 2-3 percentage points, i.e. to about zero from the current level. 
This could happen because of the shifts in sectoral structure of production  
towards capital-intensive industries, due to the depletion of mineral deposits, 
due to massive investments in infrastructure and human capital (irrigation, 
roads, education, health), which do not produce immediate returns. And this 
could also happen for reasons that we do not know. As was argued previously, 
to predict with certainty the dynamics of TFP in future is not possible, so it is 
only prudent to be prepared for unfavorable scenarios of change. In this case, 
economic growth will fall by 2-3 percentage points and an increase in 
investment required to compensate for this decline, will amount to 10-15% of 
GDP (Table 2). 
 
Worst-case scenario. If the deterioration of terms of trade coincides with a 
decrease in the rate of growth of total factor productivity, there may be a decline 
in economic growth rates by 4-5 percentage points, i.e. more than twice. To 
compensate for this reduction, the share of investment in GDP would have to 
rise to 45-50% (Table 2), which seems hardly possible in a short period of time. 
 
How can the government respond to the downside risks 
To compensate for the decline in growth due to possible deterioration of terms 
of trade and (or) falling growth rates of total factor productivity it is possible to 
increase investment financed via internal or external (capital inflows) savings. 
Strictly speaking, this is virtually the only way to counter the slowdown, as the 
growth of TFP and labor (employment) are determined largely by objective 
factors, that is, cannot be easily affected by government policy. 
 
Luckily, to mobilize additional savings Uzbekistan has significant reserves. 
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Firstly, the current savings rate – less than 25% of GDP – is not too high, many 
countries with a similar level of development have higher share of savings and 
investment in GDP. The share of investment in GDP in 2012 in Botswana, 
Belarus, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Lesotho, Mauritania, Niger, Tanzania, 
Tonga was 30% or more, whereas in China, Mongolia, Mozambique, 
Turkmenistan  it was over 40%. Secondly, the state budget is balanced with a 
surplus, and the internal and external debt is low, so there is the possibility of 
mobilizing savings through higher taxes, as well as via increase in domestic and 
foreign borrowings to finance public investments. 
 
As can be seen from Fig. 5, not only private but also public investments 
contribute to increasing the share of investment in GDP. If for some reason 
private investments are in limbo, the state can achieve the increase in total 
investments through the expansion of its own public investment projects 
financed through taxes and/or borrowings.  Government savings (financing 
public investment through government budget and/or budget surplus), as the 
studies show, do not crowd out private savings in a proportion of 1:1, but only 
in a proportion of 25-50 cents for every dollar ((Schmidt-Hebbel, Serven, and 
Solimano 1996). In low income countries, as recent research shows, an extra 
dollar of government investment does not crowd out, but crowds in private 
investment – raises them by roughly two dollars and output by 1.5 dollars 
(Eden, Kray, 2014). 
 
Strictly speaking, even under a favorable scenario it is advisable to strive to 
increase the share of investment in GDP in order to increase investment in 
infrastructure, education, health – areas that experienced a distinct lack of 
funding in the 1990s and in the 2000s. This will lay the foundations for the 
future growth and will allow avoiding surprises associated with aging and 
retirement of worn-out assets. 
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Fig. 5. Private and public investment as % of GDP in 2012 
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Source: WDI. 
 
 
 
Which industries should develop at faster pace? 
Reduction of the share of industry in GDP and the increase of the share of 
services – an objective process, but in the fast-growing countries (China), this 
decline was slower than in the others (Fig. 6). At the same time the increase in 
the share of machinery and equipment in manufacturing output, as in China 
(Fig. 6), usually accompanies rapid growth or even becomes the engine of 
growth. We do not know of any cases of rapid growth ("economic miracles"), 
which were based on accelerated growth of service sector. Increase in the share 
of industry in Uzbekistan over the past decade should therefore be considered a 
positive trend. 
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Fig. 6. The share of manufacturing and services in GDP, the share of 
industry in employment, the share of machinery in manufacturing value 
added 
Manufacturing value added as a % of GDP in BRICS countries and in the US
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Services value added as a % of GDP in BRICS countries and in the US
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Employment in industry,  % of total employnent
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Machinery and transport equipment, % of value added in manufacturing in 
BRICS countries and in the US
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Source: World Development Indicators. 
 
What are the particular manufacturing industries that could become the engine 
of growth is a difficult question. Unfortunately, economic theory does not 
suggest any definite clues, except the idea that these industries should have the 
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highest externalities, i.e. their social returns should be higher than private 
returns. But it is not so easy to measure these externalities. There may be 
several ways, though, to determine the industries that should be supported in the 
framework of industrial policy. 
 
One could benefit from the experience of other countries: it is known that 
relatively poor countries began to export textiles and shoes, then moved to the 
export of steel products and heavy chemicals, then - to the export of cars and 
electrical products (washing machines, refrigerators), then – to consumer 
electronics and computers. This scheme is called the "flying geese" - as more 
competitive countries move to more advanced types of export, the vacated 
niches are occupied by less developed countries.  
 
The transition from one exported good to the other could be dictated by the 
cycle of innovations. As Lee (2013) suggests, this cycle is short for electronics 
and long for pharmaceutical and chemicals; this may explain, why East Asian 
countries that mostly focused on industries with short cycles managed to avoid 
growth slowdowns while moving from one export niche to another. Justin Lin, 
the former chief economist of the World Bank, developed the idea of 
comparative advantages following and comparative advantages defying 
industrial strategy: the best result, according to his argument, could be achieved, 
if countries develop industries that are consistent with their comparative 
advantages, determined by their endowment structure, and do not try to 
overleap necessary stages aiming at exporting goods that are exported by very 
advanced countries (Lin, 2011). 
 
An opposite approach is that of Hausmann, Hwang, Rodrik (2006). They show 
that the gap between the actual level of development and the hypothetical level 
that corresponds to the degree of sophistication of a country’s exports is 
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strongly correlated with productivity growth rates (Hausmann et al., 2006; 
Rodrik, 2006). To put it differently, it pays off to promote exports of 
sophisticated and high tech goods. Not all the countries that try to promote such 
exports succeed, but those that do not try, virtually never engineer growth 
miracles3.   
 
One can also try to support several industries that seem promising, declaring 
that assistance will end, if the increase in export is not achieved within, say, five 
years. This is called "EPconEP" – effective protection conditional on export 
promotion (Jomo, 2013). Economic policymaker in this case is similar to the 
military commander, who begins an offensive on several fronts, but throws 
reserves where there has been a breakthrough. 
 
One can try to calculate where, in which specific industries, limited investment 
will give the greatest effect leading to the creation of globally competitive 
production.  Most likely, these would be industries with the highest level and 
highest growth rates of total factor productivity, industries that lag behind the 
most advanced countries less than the others.  
 
Finally, it is possible to choose candidates for support largely at random. It is 
only important to be consistent – embarking on the path of support of a 
particular industry, not to turn back, even if there is no immediate success and a 
breakthrough in the world markets. After all, the modern theory of international 
trade explains country specialization not by comparative advantages, but by 
"learning by doing". 
                                                            
3
 The only exception could be Botswana that had the highest rate of per-capita income growth in the world in 
1960-2000. This growth was primarily driven by exports of primary commodities (namely, diamonds) and not 
of high-tech goods.   
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If the country does not have any comparative advantage, like, say, post-war 
Japan, it is necessary to create them ("dynamic comparative advantages"), 
mastering the production of goods that have not been produced before. 
Supporting such production and consistently encouraging exports, staying on 
track and without turning back for some time, is likely to produce a learning- 
by-doing effect, allowing the country to gradually become competitive. As the 
saying goes, if Japan (that does not possess any minerals or extensive areas of 
fertile land) would rely on comparative advantages, its exports today would be 
not even sushi (which includes rice), but only sashimi. 
 
Uzbekistan created from scratch the car industry, which today produces more 
than 200 thousand cars (and their engines), and half of them are exported 
(Popov, 2014). It is an undisputable success of industrial policy, a breakthrough 
to the world markets with the products of the medium level of research 
intensity, which previously could have been achieved only by countries of 
higher level of development. 
 
In recent years, however, the next round of industrial policy focuses on heavy 
chemistry - Shurtan Gas Chemical Complex and the planned production of 
synthetic liquid fuels based on purified methane together with South African 
"Sasol" and Malaysian "Petronas", liquefied natural gas production at Mubarek 
gas processing plant, Dehkonobod Potash Fertilizer Plant, Ustyurt gas chemical 
complex at Surgil deposit. Such a strategy could create difficulties for economic 
growth. 
 
First, the gas reserves are close to depletion, it is projected that gas production 
will start to decline from 2015 (World Bank, 2013), so the use of gas for the 
production of polypropylene and other chemical products will lead to a decrease 
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in energy self-sufficiency. If the World Bank forecasts are correct (Fig. 7), 
Uzbekistan will have to import more oil and (or) gas to satisfy domestic demand 
for  energy, even though today the country is a net exporter of fuel.  Besides, 
production of synthetic liquid fuels from gas will further reduce already low 
capacity utilization at two existing refineries in Uzbekistan. 
 
 
Fig. 7. World Bank Forecast of energy production and consumption in 
Uzbekistan till 2030 
 
Source: World Bank, 2013.  
 
 
Second, the focus on the development of heavy chemistry industries can lead to 
the slowdown of growth or even to the reduction of the level of TFP. 
Calculations by IFMR (Chepel et al., 2014) show that the level of labor 
productivity and TFP and the growth rates of these indicators in the past 10 
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years were the highest in engineering, light and food industries, but not in 
petrochemicals and chemicals. 
 
Thirdly, the focus on medium tech engineering goods (auto industry) has 
justified itself, it is a proven route, perhaps it would be better to develop success 
in this area and along these lines of specialization, rather than trying to create a 
new competitive industry from scratch. The scale of the Uzbek economy may 
not be sufficient to specialize on more than one group of industries. 
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